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68 F.3d 621
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Beebe BOURNE, d/b/a Bourne Co.,
Plaintiff–Appellant–Cross–Appellee,
v.
The WALT DISNEY COMPANY and
Buena Vista Home Video, Defendants–
Appellees–Cross–Appellants,
Tower Records, Inc., Barnes & Noble
Bookstores, Inc., Blockbuster Entertainment
Corp., RKO Warner Video, Inc. and
John Does 1 through 100, Defendants.
Nos. 1578, 1579, Dockets 94–7793, 94–7847.  |
Argued June 29, 1995.  | Decided Oct. 18, 1995.
Assignee of copyrights for musical compositions contained
in two animated motion pictures brought infringement action
against motion picture company and videocassette company,
based on distribution of videocassettes of motion pictures and
use of compositions in television commercials. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Louis L. Stanton, J., entered judgment upon jury verdict
for assignee in part and for defendants in part. The District
Court denied assignee's posttrial motions for attorney's fees
and new trial but awarded costs and prejudgment interest,
1994 WL 263482. Assignee appealed, and defendants cross-
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge, held
that: (1) compositions in first motion picture were not
addressed in parties' agreement pertaining to short films; (2)
agreement pertaining to first motion picture was not fully
integrated; (3) agreement pertaining to first motion picture
could be read as implicitly incorporating grant-back provision
in agreement on short films; (4) term “motion picture” in
agreements did not unambiguously exclude videocassettes of
company's feature films; (5) assignee had burden of proving
that company's grant-back of rights under license did not
extend to videocassettes; (6) company was entitled to copy
and to sell videocassettes; and (7) assignee was not estopped
from claiming infringement based on television commercials.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes (12)
[1] Copyrights and Intellectual Property
Construction and operation
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
99I Copyrights
99I(E) Transfer
99k43 Assignments or Transfers
99k47 Construction and operation
Musical compositions contained in motion
picture company's first full-length feature
were not encompassed in agreement by
which company assigned copyrights to musical
compositions in its short films to assignee
for licensing purposes, despite reference in
agreement's preamble to motion picture comic
cartoons, as paragraph within agreement
specifically referred to certain short films
and subsequent agreements “enlarged subject
matter” of original agreement to include other
short films.
Cases that cite this headnote
[2] Copyrights and Intellectual Property
Construction and operation
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
99I Copyrights
99I(E) Transfer
99k43 Assignments or Transfers
99k47 Construction and operation
Agreement by which motion picture company
assigned copyrights for musical compositions
contained in company's first full-length animated
feature to assignee, for purpose of licensing
compositions, was not complete integration
of parties' agreement, thus, extrinsic evidence
regarding rights retained by company was
admissible in assignee's copyright infringement
action against company; claim that company
reserved no rights was implausible, as company
would not likely forego rights to use
compositions in release and rereleases of
feature, company reserved some rights in similar
prior agreements, assignee did not take action
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under agreement to prevent company's use
of compositions in connection with theatrical
releases prior to instant action, and agreement
was merely printed form contract.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[3] Evidence
Completeness of writing and presumption
in relation thereto;  integration
157 Evidence
157XI Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding to
Terms of Written Instrument
157k397 Contracts in General
157k397(2) Completeness of writing and
presumption in relation thereto;  integration
Under New York law, where written agreement
does not contain merger clause, court must
determine whether agreement is integrated
by reading writing in light of surrounding
circumstances, and by determining whether or
not agreement was one which parties would
ordinarily be expected to embody in writing;
decision must turn upon type of transaction
involved, scope of written contract, and content
of any other agreements asserted.
14 Cases that cite this headnote
[4] Copyrights and Intellectual Property
Construction and operation
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
99I Copyrights
99I(E) Transfer
99k43 Assignments or Transfers
99k47 Construction and operation
Agreement by which motion picture company
assigned copyrights for musical compositions
contained in company's first full-length animated
feature to assignee, for purpose of licensing
compositions, did not, as matter of law, exclude
any reservation of rights by company as
to use of compositions for certain purposes,
notwithstanding omission of express reservation
of such rights; jury could infer, based on extrinsic
evidence, that parties implicitly incorporated
grant-back provision of parties' earlier agreement
pertaining to short films.
8 Cases that cite this headnote
[5] Contracts
Language of contract
95 Contracts
95II Construction and Operation
95II(A) General Rules of Construction
95k147 Intention of Parties
95k147(2) Language of contract
Primary objective of contract construction is to
give effect to intent of contracting parties as
revealed by language they chose to use.
12 Cases that cite this headnote
[6] Contracts
Questions for Jury
Contracts
Ambiguity in general
Evidence
Grounds for admission of extrinsic evidence
95 Contracts
95II Construction and Operation
95II(A) General Rules of Construction
95k176 Questions for Jury
95k176(1) In general
95 Contracts
95II Construction and Operation
95II(A) General Rules of Construction
95k176 Questions for Jury
95k176(2) Ambiguity in general
157 Evidence
157XI Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting
Writings
157XI(D) Construction or Application of
Language of Written Instrument
157k448 Grounds for admission of extrinsic
evidence
If language of contract is unambiguous and
conveys definite meaning, then interpretation
of contract is question of law for court;
alternatively, where language used is susceptible
to differing interpretations, each of which may
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be said to be as reasonable as another, then
interpretation of contract becomes question of
fact for jury and extrinsic evidence of parties'
intent properly is admissible.
17 Cases that cite this headnote
[7] Copyrights and Intellectual Property
Construction and operation
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
99I Copyrights
99I(E) Transfer
99k43 Assignments or Transfers
99k47 Construction and operation
Term “motion picture,” as used in agreement
by which motion picture company assigned
copyrights for musical compositions contained
in animated features to assignee, for purpose
of licensing compositions, but reserved right
to record those compositions in synchronism
with motion pictures, did not unambiguously
exclude subsequently produced videocassettes
of those features; term “motion picture” was
not limited to particular type of storage media
and fact that videocassettes were unknown at
time of agreement did not mean they were not
contemplated by parties.
8 Cases that cite this headnote
[8] Copyrights and Intellectual Property
Presumptions and burden of proof
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
99I Copyrights
99I(J) Infringement
99I(J)2 Remedies
99k72 Actions for Infringement
99k83 Evidence
99k83(1) Presumptions and burden of proof
Where alleged copyright infringer claims
defense of license, burden of coming forward
with evidence of license is placed upon alleged
infringer since evidence of license is readily
available to that party.
28 Cases that cite this headnote
[9] Copyrights and Intellectual Property
Presumptions and burden of proof
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
99I Copyrights
99I(J) Infringement
99I(J)2 Remedies
99k72 Actions for Infringement
99k83 Evidence
99k83(1) Presumptions and burden of proof
Where scope, not existence, of license was at
issue in copyright infringement action, copyright
owner bore burden of proving that defendant's
copying was unauthorized; just as in ordinary
contract action, party claiming breach carries
burden of persuasion.
45 Cases that cite this headnote
[10] Copyrights and Intellectual Property
Construction and operation
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
99I Copyrights
99I(E) Transfer
99k43 Assignments or Transfers
99k47 Construction and operation
Motion picture company which assigned
copyrights in musical compositions contained
in two animated motion pictures to assignee,
for purpose of licensing rights to musical
compositions, and then received license from
assignee allowing company to synchronize
compositions with its motion pictures, was
entitled to create and sell videocassettes of
motions pictures which contained compositions;
company lawfully obtained rights under license
and had right to transfer lawfully made copies
under Copyright Act, and assignee received
sufficient “reward” for company's sale of
videocassettes. 17 U.S.C.A. § 27 (1909).
4 Cases that cite this headnote
[11] Federal Civil Procedure
Evidence
170A Federal Civil Procedure
170AXVII Judgment
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170AXVII(E) Notwithstanding Verdict; 
 Judgment as Matter of Law
170Ak2608 Evidence
170Ak2608.1 In general
Judgment as matter of law cannot be granted
on issue if there is legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for reasonable jury to find to contrary.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 50, 28 U.S.C.A.
Cases that cite this headnote
[12] Copyrights and Intellectual Property
Assignments or Transfers
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
99I Copyrights
99I(E) Transfer
99k43 Assignments or Transfers
99k44 In general
Assignee of copyright in musical compositions
contained in two of motion picture company's
animated movies was not, as matter of law,
estopped from asserting that company infringed
copyrights by using compositions in television
commercials, although company sometimes
used compositions in that manner without
obtaining license from assignee, where company
obtained licenses for such use of compositions
over period of several years in which its
television advertisements were infrequent.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
Attorneys and Law Firms
*623  Stuart A. Summit (George Berger, Theodore C. Max,
Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon, New York City, of
counsel), for Plaintiff–Appellant–Cross–Appellee.
Sanford M. Litvack (Jacob M. Yellin, The Walt Disney
Company, Burbank, CA, Clark E. Walter, Joanna R.
Swomley, Dewey Ballantine, New York City, of counsel), for
Defendants–Appellees–Cross–Appellants.
Stephen H. Sulmeyer, Santa Monica, CA, for Karen Adams
and Gretchen Thomas Anderson as amici curiae.
Alan L. Shulman, Scott L. Baker, Silverman & Shulman,
P.C., New York City, of counsel, for National Music
Publishers' Association, Inc. as amicus curiae.
Fritz E. Attaway, Motion Picture Association of America,
Inc., Washington, DC, Jon A. Baumgarten, Charles S. Sims,
Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn, New York City, of
counsel, for The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.
as amicus curiae.
Dixon Q. Dern, Warren D. Dern, Dern & Vein, Los Angeles,
CA, of counsel, for Video Software Dealers Association as
amicus curiae.
Before: VAN GRAAFEILAND and MINER, Circuit Judges,
and COTE, District Judge. *
* The Honorable Denise Cote of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
designation.
Opinion
MINER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant-cross-appellee Beebe Bourne, doing
business as the Bourne Co. (“Bourne”), brought this
copyright infringement action against defendants-appellees-
cross-appellants Walt Disney Co. and Buena Vista Home
Video (collectively, “Disney”).
Bourne's first claim of infringement arose from Disney's sale
of videocassette recordings featuring Bourne's copyrighted
compositions from the motion pictures “Snow White and
the Seven Dwarfs” and “Pinocchio” (“the Compositions”).
Although the Compositions were written by Disney
employees, Disney had assigned the copyrights in the
Compositions to Irving Berlin, Inc. (“Berlin”), a music
publisher and the predecessor-in-interest to Bourne, in the
1930s when the movies first were released.
While conceding that the instrument conveying Disney's
copyrights in the Pinocchio compositions to Bourne
provided Disney with a license to use the compositions
“in synchronism with any and all of the motion pictures
which may be made by [Disney],” Bourne argued that
these rights were insufficient to allow Disney to distribute
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the compositions on videocassette. With respect to the
compositions from Snow White, Bourne argued that these
copyrights were assigned to Bourne without the grant of
a license to Disney allowing it to use the compositions.
In Bourne's view, Disney had no right to use *624  the
compositions from Snow White until 1961, when Bourne
conveyed certain rights to Disney in settlement of litigation
then pending between the parties. The jury rejected each of
Bourne's arguments.
Bourne's second copyright infringement claim related to
Disney's use of the Compositions in television commercials.
Bourne contended that the licenses granted to Disney did not
provide Disney with the right to use the Compositions in
these advertisements. The jury found in Bourne's favor on this
claim. In so doing, the jury rejected Disney's argument that
Bourne was estopped from asserting its interpretation of the
license agreements. The parties stipulated to damages in the
amount of $420,000.
On appeal, Bourne's principal contention is that the district
court erred in failing to enter judgment as a matter of law in
its favor on its claim regarding Disney's sale of videocassettes
containing the Compositions. Bourne also argues that the
district court improperly placed upon it the burden of proving
that Disney's use of the Compositions was unauthorized.
Finally, Bourne appeals from the district court's denial of
certain ancillary relief in connection with its successful
claim regarding the television advertisements. Disney cross-
appeals, contending that the district court erred in failing to
enter judgment as a matter of law in its favor on its defense
of estoppel. Disney also takes issue with certain aspects of
the district court's jury charge. For the reasons that follow, we
reject each of these challenges and affirm the judgment of the
district court in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
1. The Agreements
a. The 1933 “Shorts” Agreement
Since 1928, Disney has been in the business of creating
animated motion pictures. These films include music, which
is synchronized to the movement depicted in the drawings.
During the 1930s, Disney was best known for creating
six- to eight-minute animated motion pictures, called “short
subjects” or “shorts,” featuring such characters as Mickey
and Minnie Mouse, Goofy, and Donald Duck. At that
time, Disney had no means of commercially exploiting the
music featured in its shorts. In order to generate additional
revenue from its musical compositions, Disney entered into
an agreement with Berlin, one of the largest music publishers
at that time.
Pursuant to a 1933 agreement between Berlin and Disney
(“the 1933 Shorts Agreement”), Disney assigned the
copyrights in the “musical compositions written for and used
in connection with the synchronized motion picture comic
cartoons of [Disney]” in exchange for a share of the revenues
received by Berlin for use of the music. In derogation of the
broad language set forth in the preamble of the agreement,
paragraph nine limited the scope of the agreement in the
following manner:
[T]he motion picture comic cartoons
contemplated herein shall be the
remaining twenty-six (26) motion
picture cartoons to be produced for
the motion picture season of 1933–
34, plus the following motion picture
comic cartoons comprised within the
series produced for the motion picture
season of 1932–33: [listing titles of
seven cartoons].
In order to allow Disney to use its musical compositions in
connection with the animations for which they were written,
paragraph two of the agreement granted back to Disney
the right to record ... such music,
mechanically, and perform the license
others to perform the same in
connection with the respective motion
picture for which such music was
especially written, the right to record
such music mechanically in any and all
other motion pictures to be produced
by [Disney], the right to ship, import
and export ... any and all such
mechanical recordings throughout the
world, but only in connection with
[Disney's] pictures. [Disney] reserves
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television rights in respect to its
motion picture comic cartoons....
(emphasis added).
The 1933 Shorts Agreement was extended by the parties
during the next several years. In 1935, the parties enlarged the
subject matter of the agreement to include the musical *625
compositions contained in 18 additional Mickey Mouse and
Silly Symphony cartoons. In 1936, the scope of the 1933
agreement again was expanded, this time to include the
musical compositions contained in a series of cartoons to be
distributed under an agreement with RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.
The 1936 agreement was supplemented by a letter agreement
in 1939 to include the “music and compositions contained in
[Disney's] short subject motion pictures for the ... 1937–38
and 1938–39” seasons.
b. Snow White and the 1937 Assignment Agreement
Disney's first feature-length film, Snow White, was exhibited
in theaters beginning in December of 1937. Sometime
before the movie's premiere, Disney assigned to Berlin
the copyrights to eight musical compositions from Snow
White. Pursuant to this agreement (“the 1937 Assignment
Agreement”), Berlin agreed to pay Disney a share of the
royalties that it received from licensees of these compositions.
The printed-form agreement used to memorialize the
copyright assignment did not reserve any rights to Disney, nor
did it grant Disney a license to use the musical compositions
in any manner. Notwithstanding this lack of an express
license, Snow White was released in theaters on a number
of occasions while the principals to the transaction still were
alive, without complaint from Berlin or its successor, Bourne.
c. The 1939 Pinocchio Agreement
On August 15, 1939, Disney entered into a new and separate
agreement with Berlin (“the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement”),
assigning to Berlin the copyrights in (1) the compositions
from Disney's full-length motion picture, Pinocchio, and (2)
the short subjects comprising Disney's 1939–40 series, in
exchange for certain royalties. This agreement specifically
granted back to Disney
the non-exclusive right to
mechanically and/or electrically
record the said musical
compositions ... in synchronism with
any and all of the motion pictures
which may be made by [Disney] and
the right to export such recordings to
all of the countries of the world, and
the right to give public performances
of such recordings in connection with
the exhibition of the motion pictures
with which said recordings were
synchronized.
The parties agree that this agreement is fully integrated and is
not dependent on any prior agreements.
d. The 1961 Settlement Agreement
In 1957, following the death of Saul Bourne, who was
the owner of Bourne, Inc., Disney sued to recapture the
copyrights in the Compositions, alleging that the copyrights
were held in trust by Bourne on the condition that they
would be assigned back to Disney upon demand. In its
complaint, Disney described the 1933 Agreement as “relating
to the music in certain short motion picture subjects;”
the 1937 Assignment Agreement as the only agreement
concerning Snow White; and the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement
as the only contract concerning Pinocchio. The litigation was
settled in 1961 by mutual agreement (“the 1961 Settlement
Agreement”). Although the 1961 Settlement Agreement
granted Disney a license in the theatrical motion picture and
television grand performing rights in the Compositions, as
defined by the American Society of Composers, Authors,
and Publishers, nothing in the settlement agreement gave
Disney the right to synchronize or fix the Compositions on
videocassette.
2. Disney's Use of the Compositions
a. In General
At trial, Disney introduced substantial evidence that it had
used the Compositions for decades in a variety of ways,
without complaint from Bourne. As noted above, Snow White
was released in 1937 and re-released seven times thereafter.
In connection with the re-releases of both Pinocchio and
Snow White, Disney created theatrical trailers, using the
Compositions, which were run as “coming attractions”
in movie theaters. Disney also used the Compositions in
connection with its weekly television show that began in 1954
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and ran for almost four decades. In particular, the song “When
You Wish Upon a Star” from Pinocchio was used as the
standard *626  opening and closing for the series. There also
was evidence that Disney sold reel-to-reel movies containing
the Compositions for home use.
b. Videocassettes
The first videocassette recording that Disney made and
sold containing Bourne's copyrighted compositions was
the subject of a 1979 license agreement between Bourne
and Disney (“the 1979 Agreement”). Pursuant to this
agreement, Disney received a license to manufacture and sell
videocassette recordings of a live theatrical performance of
the Snow White compositions held at Radio City Music Hall.
Bourne received a 68 cent royalty for each videocassette sold.
In the early 1980s, Disney introduced videocassettes
containing various animated pictures synchronized with
Bourne's compositions. In 1985, Disney released the full-
length motion picture Pinocchio on videocassette. Prior to this
time, Disney had a policy of prohibiting the exploitation of
its full-length feature films in media other than theatrically-
exhibited film. Indeed, pursuant to Disney's policy, films such
as Snow White and Pinocchio were exhibited in theaters every
six to eight years. This policy was abandoned after a change in
Disney's management in 1984. The Pinocchio videocassette
remained on Billboard's list of top-selling videocassettes for
almost three years.
Since the release of Pinocchio, Snow White also has been
distributed on videocassette. Besides the release of Disney's
feature films, the Compositions have been used by Disney in
connection with “sing-along” programs and certain cartoons.
c. Advertising
Disney also has used the Compositions in paid television
commercials to advertise its theme parks and the theatrical
releases of Snow White and Pinocchio. Overall, Disney
utilized such paid television advertising infrequently and on
a regional, rather than a national, basis until the mid–1980s.
On several occasions, Disney obtained licenses from Bourne
for the use of the Compositions in its commercials. In 1975,
Bourne issued a license to Disney for a television commercial
using the song “When You Wish Upon a Star” to promote
Disneyland. In 1977, Disney paid Bourne a fee to use one of
its copyrighted compositions from Snow White in connection
with a television advertisement for Disney World and Eastern
Airlines. Again, in 1985, Disney obtained a license from
Bourne for the use of the Compositions in its television
commercials.
In the majority of instances, however, Disney has used the
Compositions in its paid television advertisements without
obtaining a license from Bourne. In January of 1987, Disney
began its “What's Next” series, in which it used the song
“When You Wish Upon a Star” in a national television
campaign without a license from Bourne. Disney also used
the Compositions in television commercials to promote the
theatrical releases of Pinocchio in 1984 and Snow White in
1987, even though it had not obtained a license.
3. Proceedings Below
Following an eleven-day trial, 1  the jury returned a verdict
in favor of Bourne on its second claim, finding that Disney
infringed Bourne's copyrights by using the Compositions in
television advertising. On Bourne's first claim, concerning
Disney's right to use the Compositions in videocassettes, the
jury found for Disney. The parties stipulated to the sum of
$420,000 in damages. The district court denied Bourne's post-
trial motions for attorney's fees and a new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence, and granted its motions for costs
and prejudgment interest.
1 In an earlier appeal to this court, Bourne Co. v. Tower
Records, Inc., 976 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.1992), we reversed
the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction in
favor of Bourne. We held that Bourne had failed to
establish that it would suffer irreparable harm absent the
issuance of an injunction, primarily because Disney had,
for decades, used the Compositions for purposes other
than the theatrical exhibition of motion pictures.
DISCUSSION
1. Disney's Rights to Make and Sell Videocassettes
a. Disney's Rights in Snow White
Bourne argues that the district court erred in submitting to the
jury the question of *627  whether Disney has a license for
the musical compositions from Snow White. Bourne bases
this argument on its contentions that (1) Snow White clearly
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falls outside the scope of the 1933 Shorts Agreement, and
(2) the 1937 Assignment Agreement, by which the copyrights
in musical compositions from Snow White were assigned to
Bourne, did not contain a provision granting rights back to
Disney. Accordingly, Bourne argues that the district court
erred in failing to enter judgment as a matter of law in its favor
with regard to Snow White.
[1]  As to Bourne's first contention, we agree that the musical
compositions from Snow White clearly fall outside the scope
of the 1933 Shorts Agreement. In arguing that the agreement
was ambiguous, Disney points to the broad language of the
preamble of the 1933 Agreement, which states: “[Bourne]
desires to acquire the copyrights for the musical compositions
written for and used in connection with the synchronized
motion picture comic cartoons of [Disney].” Disney reasons
that, since Snow White is a “motion picture comic cartoon,”
the agreement could be read to include the Snow White
compositions. We disagree.
Disney's construction of the preamble is belied by paragraph
nine of the agreement, which provides:
[T]he motion picture comic cartoons
contemplated herein shall be the
remaining twenty-six (26) motion
picture cartoons to be produced for
the motion picture season of 1933–
34, plus the following motion picture
comic cartoons comprised within the
series produced for the motion picture
season of 1932–33: [listing titles of
seven cartoons].
Snow White's compositions clearly fall outside the scope of
paragraph nine. Reading the contract as a whole, as we must,
see Kinek v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 22 F.3d 503,
509 (2d Cir.1994), we conclude that Disney's reliance on
the preamble is misplaced. Moreover, Disney's construction
of the agreement is contradicted by the parties' subsequent
agreements in 1935, 1936, and 1939, in which the parties
enlarged “the subject matter” of the 1933 Shorts Agreement
by adding certain motion picture comic cartoons “in addition
to those set forth in paragraph ‘9’ of the [prior] contract.”
Accordingly, we conclude that the Snow White compositions
fall outside the scope of the 1933 Shorts Agreement.
[2]  [3]  However, our examination of the 1937 Assignment
Agreement persuades us that it was not intended to be a
complete integration of the mutual promises between Disney
and Bourne, and, therefore, that extrinsic evidence of the
implied grant of a license to Disney properly was admitted.
Under New York law, where, as here, the written agreement
does not contain a merger clause, the court must determine
whether the agreement is integrated “by reading the writing
in the light of surrounding circumstances, and by determining
whether or not the agreement was one which the parties would
ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing.” Braten v.
Bankers Trust Co., 60 N.Y.2d 155, 468 N.Y.S.2d 861, 864,
456 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1983) (quoting Ball v. Grady, 267 N.Y.
470, 472, 196 N.E. 402 (1935)). The “[d]ecision in each case
must, of course, turn upon the type of transaction involved,
the scope of the written contract” and the content of any other
agreements asserted. Fogelson v. Rackfay Constr. Co., 300
N.Y. 334, 338, 90 N.E.2d 881 (1950).
We believe that the circumstances surrounding the 1937
Assignment Agreement compel the conclusion that the
agreement was not intended to be an integration. If, as Bourne
contends, the 1937 Assignment Agreement was intended
to constitute the entire agreement concerning the musical
compositions from Snow White, then Disney would have
been left with no right to use the compositions in the original
release of the motion picture in 1937 or in any of the
subsequent releases. That Disney would relinquish, on the
eve of Snow White's theatrical release, all rights in the
compositions that it composed specifically for use in the
motion picture is highly implausible.
Other factors also weigh against finding that the agreement
was intended to be an integration. First, for Disney not to
have received a grant-back from Bourne would have marked
a considerable departure from *628  the prior business
relationship between the companies. The prior agreements
between the parties demonstrate that Disney, a motion picture
producer, turned to Bourne, a music publisher, to exploit
commercially the musical compositions that Disney created
in connection with its motion pictures. In each instance,
Disney retained certain rights in the compositions so as to
allow Disney to continue to put them to the use for which they
originally were written. Indeed, the use of the Compositions
by Disney in connection with its motion pictures was essential
to the purpose of the agreements, since Bourne's ability to
exploit successfully the Compositions depended, in large part,
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on the success of Disney's motion pictures. See Saxon Capital
Corp. v. Wilvin Assocs., 195 A.D.2d 429, 600 N.Y.S.2d 708,
709 (1st Dep't 1993) (“[T]he condition [absent from the
writing] was so central to the purpose of the [agreement] that
the condition might well have been perceived by defendants
as self-evident and its omission unremarkable.”).
The parties' conduct subsequent to the agreement also weighs
against finding that the 1937 Assignment Agreement was
intended to be an integration. Berlin and its successor,
Bourne, certainly were aware of Snow White's successful
theatrical releases. Yet, Bourne never contended, until this
litigation, that Disney did not have the right to use the musical
compositions written for Snow White in synchronization with
the motion picture. Finally, we note that the 1937 Assignment
Agreement was a printed-form contract, prepared by Bourne,
and apparently signed without extensive negotiations or the
involvement of legal counsel. Cf. Braten, 468 N.Y.S.2d at
864, 456 N.E.2d at 804 (in concluding that the contract
was a complete integration, the court relied on the fact that
“[t]he parties and their counsel negotiated during a two-
month period, resulting in a specially drawn document”).
Based on the foregoing considerations, we are confident that
a New York court would conclude that the 1937 Assignment
Agreement was not intended to be a complete integration. See
Saxon, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 709. Accordingly, extrinsic evidence
properly was admitted to prove that the parties intended
to grant back to Disney certain rights in the Snow White
compositions.
[4]  Although there was little direct evidence of the specific
terms of the grant-back, we believe that Disney presented
persuasive evidence that the contracting parties intended
the grant-back provisions set forth in the 1933 Shorts
Agreement to govern Disney's rights to the Snow White
compositions. The 1933 Shorts Agreement, which had been
expanded in 1935 and 1936, was the only written agreement
between the parties that delineated Disney's rights in musical
compositions that it had turned over to Bourne to exploit.
Furthermore, correspondence between the parties indicates
that the compositions from Snow White were being delivered
to Bourne “for the usual purpose,” evincing an intent to have
the matter controlled by a framework already established by
the parties. Therefore, the evidence demonstrates an implied
understanding between Disney and Bourne that Disney's
rights to the Snow White compositions were to be controlled
by the 1933 Shorts Agreement. Accordingly, we conclude
that, while the compositions from Snow White do not fall
explicitly within the scope of the 1933 Shorts Agreement, the
jury reasonably could have found that the parties implicitly
incorporated the grant-back provision of the 1933 Shorts
Agreement into the 1937 Assignment Agreement. Therefore,
the district court did not err in submitting this matter to the
jury.
b. Disney's Rights to Produce Videocassettes
Bourne argues that the district court also erred by submitting
to the jury the question of whether the 1933 Shorts
Agreement and the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement provided
Disney with a license to synchronize the Compositions with
its videocassette images (“videocassette rights”). Bourne
contends that videocassette rights fall outside the specific
language of the grant, and that, because videocassette
technology was unknown at the time of the agreements, such
rights could not have been within the contemplation of the
parties.
[5]  [6]  The relevant principles of contract construction are
well-established. The primary *629  objective “is to give
effect to the intent of the [contracting] parties as revealed
by the language they chose to use.” Seiden Assocs., Inc. v.
ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d 425, 428 (2d Cir.1992). If
the language of the contract is “unambiguous and conveys
a definite meaning,” then the interpretation of the contract
is a question of law for the court. Sayers v. Rochester Tel.
Corp. Supplemental Management Pension Plan, 7 F.3d 1091,
1094 (2d Cir.1993); see Seiden, 959 F.2d at 428 (contract
language “is not ambiguous when it has a definite and precise
meaning ... concerning which there is no reasonable basis
for a difference in opinion” (internal quotations omitted)).
Alternatively, “[w]here the language used is susceptible to
differing interpretations, each of which may be said to be as
reasonable as another,” then the interpretation of the contract
becomes a question of fact for the jury and extrinsic evidence
of the parties' intent properly is admissible. Seiden, 959 F.2d
at 428; see Walk–In Medical Ctrs., Inc. v. Breuer Capital
Corp., 818 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir.1987) (stating that language
is ambiguous if it is “capable of more than one meaning when
viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who
has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement
and who is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and
terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or
business” (internal quotations omitted)).
Roffer, Michael 8/5/2015
For Educational Use Only
Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621 (1995)
1995 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,460, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449
 © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10
[7]  In order to analyze Bourne's contention that Disney has
no right to produce videocassettes utilizing the Compositions,
we first must look to the specific language of the grants. If
the production of home videocassettes clearly falls outside the
scope of the grants, then Disney's use of the Compositions
was unauthorized as a matter of law, and, therefore, the
district court erred in submitting this question to the jury.
The 1939 Pinocchio Agreement provided Disney with “the
non-exclusive right to mechanically and/or electrically record
the said musical compositions ... in synchronism with any
and all of the motion pictures which may be made by
[Disney].” (emphasis added). Similarly, the 1933 Shorts
Agreement, which we believe also controlled Disney's rights
with respect to the compositions from Snow White, granted
to Disney “the right to record such music mechanically
in any and all other motion pictures to be produced by
[Disney].” (emphasis added). As is apparent from the
emphasized portions of the quoted language, the issue is
whether, as Bourne contends, the term “motion picture”
unambiguously excludes home videocassettes.
In support of this contention, Bourne makes several
arguments. First, Bourne notes that, during the 1930s, the
term “motion picture” was used to refer to the exhibition
of projected images from celluloid film in a theater. In
that sense, it was a reference to a specific type of medium
for distributing images, rather than to the actual content
of the work itself. This understanding of the term “motion
picture” was supported by the testimony of Bourne's expert
witness, Renville McMann, Jr., an expert in television and
videocassette technology.
Bourne also relies on the fact that the 1933 Shorts Agreement
specifically gave Disney the right to use the Compositions
on television, while the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement did not
expressly grant Disney television rights. From this, Bourne
asks us to infer that the parties intended only a narrow transfer
of rights in the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement. Bourne also asks
us to infer that the parties perceived a difference between a
motion picture and the broadcast of the same on television.
In addition, Bourne emphasizes that video cassette recorders
(“VCRs”) and videocassettes were unknown commercially
at the time the agreement was signed. Bourne argues that
both the First and Ninth Circuits, as well as the New York
state courts, have held “that rights to future technologies
such as videocassette recording are not conveyed where the
technology was unknown at the time the parties entered
into the bargain and no broad license of rights exists.” In
making this argument, Bourne relies on a line of cases
which essentially have held that the grant of television
rights does not include home videocassette rights. See
Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1390 (1st Cir.) (license
to produce episodes “for television viewing” held not to
include home videocassette rights), cert. denied, *630  510
U.S. 828, 114 S.Ct. 94, 126 L.Ed.2d 61 (1993); Cohen v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.1988)
(holding that the right to exhibit a motion picture “by
means of television” does not include the right to distribute
videocassettes of the film); Tele–Pac, Inc. v. Grainger, 168
A.D.2d 11, 570 N.Y.S.2d 521, 522 (1st Dep't 1991) (license
to distribute the subject motion pictures “for broadcasting
by television or any other similar device now known or
hereafter to be made known” held not to include home
videocassette rights). These cases, however, did not address
the precise issue presented here: whether the grant of rights
to synchronize musical compositions with “motion pictures”
allows for videocassette synchronization.
While the arguments relied upon by Bourne are not entirely
without merit, we cannot agree that the term “motion picture”
has a sufficiently definite and precise meaning as to allow
for interpretation as a matter of law. Rather than referring
simply to the celluloid-film medium, we believe that the term
“motion picture” reasonably can be understood to refer to
a broad genus whose fundamental
characteristic is a series of related
images that impart an impression of
motion when shown in succession,
including any sounds integrally
conjoined with the images. Under this
concept the physical form in which
the motion picture is fixed—film, tape,
discs, and so forth—is irrelevant....
S.Rep. No. 72, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971), U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 1971 at 1566 (providing Congress'
understanding of “motion pictures” under the Copyright Act
of 1909). Peter Nolan, a long-time Disney employee, and Dr.
Richard Koszarski, curator of the American Museum of the
Moving Image, both testified in support of this understanding.
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As Dr. Koszarski explained, there is no practical difference
between storing a motion picture on film, videocassette, or
any other storage media. We also note that Congress adopted
the broader definition of the term “motion picture” in enacting
the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101. (“ ‘Motion
pictures' are audiovisual works consisting of a series of
related images which, when shown in succession, impart an
impression of motion, together with accompanying sounds,
if any.”) Accordingly, we agree with the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Bloom v. Hearst Entertainment, Inc., 33 F.3d 518,
525 (5th Cir.1994), in which the court held that “a general
grant of motion picture rights is potentially broad enough to
contemplate ... [videocassettes] as [a] means of distribution.”
Insofar as Bourne contends that, because videocassettes were
unknown at the time of the agreement, their use could
not have been within the contemplation of the parties, we
disagree. While the specific technology underlying today's
VCRs was not available during the 1930s, Disney introduced
credible evidence demonstrating that home viewing of motion
pictures was within the contemplation of persons in the
motion picture industry during the 1930s. Indeed, even in the
1930s Disney made available certain short subject cartoons
for home viewing. Furthermore, Disney's expert witness, Dr.
Koszarski, testified regarding the non-celluloid methods of
storing motion pictures that were under development during
the 1930s.
Having concluded that the language of the grant to Disney
reasonably is broad enough to cover videocassettes and that
the possibility that Disney could market its motion pictures
for home viewing was recognized by persons knowledgeable
in the entertainment and motion picture industries, we believe
that the district court properly submitted to the jury the
question of whether the 1933 Shorts Agreement and the
1939 Pinocchio Agreement provided Disney with the right
to synchronize the Compositions to videocassettes containing
its motion pictures.
c. Burden of Proof
Bourne contends that, even if the district court properly
submitted the issue of contract interpretation to the jury,
the court erred in its jury charge regarding the burden of
proof. The district court charged the jury that Bourne, as the
plaintiff-licensor, had the burden of proving that Disney's use
of the Compositions was unauthorized. Bourne argues that
a license is an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright
infringement, and, therefore, that Disney had the burden
of *631  proving that its use of the Compositions was
authorized.
[8]  Bourne is correct insofar as it contends that the
possession of a license by an accused infringer traditionally
has been characterized as a matter of affirmative defense.
See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer
on Copyright § 13.01 (“Nimmer”). However, in most of the
cases addressing the defense of license, the issue has been
whether a license is held by the accused infringer. See, e.g.,
CMS Software Design Sys., Inc. v. Info Designs, Inc., 785
F.2d 1246, 1247 (5th Cir.1986). Since, in such cases, evidence
of a license is readily available to the alleged licensee, it
is sensible to place upon that party the burden of coming
forward with evidence of a license. See United States v.
Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672, 674 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that
a defendant charged with criminal copyright infringement
bears the burden of producing evidence of a sub-license).
[9]  In this case, however, there is no dispute that
Disney received from Bourne various licenses to copyrighted
compositions. The only dispute is whether Disney's
synchronization of the Compositions with its home
videocassettes and its use of the Compositions in its television
commercials fall within the scope of the existing licenses.
See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 20
(2d Cir.1976) (licensee infringes owner's copyright if its use
exceeds the scope of the license). Thus, the only dispute here
is the scope of the licenses, not their existence.
We conclude that, in cases where only the scope of the license
is at issue, the copyright owner bears the burden of proving
that the defendant's copying was unauthorized. See S.O.S.,
Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir.1989) (“To
prevail on its claim of copyright infringement, [the copyright
owner] must prove ... ‘copying’ of protectible expression by
[the accused infringer] beyond the scope of [the] license.”);
Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, Inc.,
846 F.Supp. 208, 210 (E.D.N.Y.1994); see also NLFC, Inc. v.
Devcom Mid–America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 235 n. 5 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1104, 115 S.Ct. 2249, 132 L.Ed.2d 257
(1995). Copyright disputes involving only the scope of the
alleged infringer's license present the court with a question
that essentially is one of contract: whether the parties' license
agreement encompasses the defendant's activities. Just as in
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an ordinary contract action, the party claiming a breach carries
the burden of persuasion. See Gordon v. Leonetti, 324 F.2d
491, 492 (2d Cir.1963).
d. Disney's Right to Distribute Videocassettes
[10]  Bourne further argues that, even if Disney had the right
to synchronize the Compositions with videocassettes, Disney
had no right to sell or publicly distribute the videocassettes
that it produced. Bourne asserts that Disney needed
two separate grants from Bourne to make and distribute
videocassettes containing the synchronized Compositions:
(1) the right to copy (or record) the Compositions in
synchronization with Disney's motion pictures; and (2) a
separate right to sell or distribute the videocassettes. Since
the grants to Disney do not specifically include the latter
right, Bourne argues, Disney's sale and distribution of
its videocassettes constitute an infringement of Bourne's
copyrights in the Compositions, even if the license granted
Disney the former right.
Under the Copyright Act of 1909 (“the 1909 Act”), 2  the
copyright holder has the exclusive right to “publish ...
and vend the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1909
Act). Although Disney has been “vending” works without
any express license from Bourne, Disney contends that its
activities fall within the first sale doctrine. Section 27 of the
1909 Act provides:
2 Since the copyrights at issue were registered during the
1930s, when the 1909 Act was in force, plaintiff's claims
must be analyzed under that act. See Playboy Enters., Inc.
v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir.1995).
The copyright is distinct from the property in the material
object copyrighted, and the sale or conveyance ... of the
material object shall not of itself constitute a transfer of the
copyright ...; but nothing *632  in this title shall be deemed
to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully
obtained.
17 U.S.C. § 27 (1909 Act) (emphasis added). A similar
provision appears in the Copyright Act of 1976. See 17
U.S.C. § 109. 3  These provisions generally are considered
to enunciate the first sale doctrine. See Nimmer, supra,
§ 8.12[B]. Disney argues that, since it was authorized
under the various license agreements to synchronize the
Compositions with its videocassettes, the first sale doctrine
permits it to transfer the resulting videocassettes as it sees
fit.
3 Section 109 provides that, “[n]otwithstanding the
[copyright owner's exclusive right to distribute copies
granted by 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) ], the owner of a particular
copy or phonorecord lawfully made ... is entitled, without
the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”
17 U.S.C. § 109.
In Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d
847 (2d Cir.1963), this court noted that, while the language
of section 27 is quite expansive, a literal reading of the statute
is unacceptable, stating that
[i]f lawful possession by another
sufficed to deprive the copyright
proprietor of his right to control the
transfer of the copyrighted objects, any
bailee of such objects could sell them
without infringing the copyright.... In
view of the necessary role played by
manufacturers, shippers, and others
in producing and distributing copies
of copyrighted works, ... a copyright
proprietor could not present his work
to the public without risking the loss of
part of his copyright protection.
Id. at 851. The court also noted that a literal reading of the
statute would leave a “purchaser of a copy from a conceded
pirate ... free to resell” the copy. Id. Rather than looking
simply at whether the lawful possession of the copy has
passed, we framed the issue as “whether or not there has been
such a disposition of the article that it may fairly be said
that the ... [copyright proprietor] has received his reward for
the use of the article.” Id. at 854 (quoting United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278, 62 S.Ct. 1070, 1077, 86
L.Ed. 1461 (1942)).
Relying primarily on Platt & Munk, Bourne contends that
the first sale doctrine is inapplicable here. Bourne argues that
Disney, even if it lawfully possessed the videocassettes, did
not acquire the videocassettes as the result of a “first sale”
by Bourne, the copyright owner. Since no transfer of copies
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passed from Bourne to Disney, Bourne argues that no “first
sale” has occurred. We disagree.
In our view, Bourne reads our decision in Platt & Munk
too broadly. This is not a case where the party claiming
the benefit of the first sale doctrine is simply a bailee that
acquired a possessory interest in the goods. For example,
the possessor of the copies in Platt & Munk was an unpaid
manufacturer of goods that were alleged to be defective by the
copyright proprietor who had ordered them. 315 F.2d at 849.
Here, the party claiming the benefit of the first sale doctrine,
Disney, was licensed by Bourne to exploit the copyrighted
compositions in connection with its motion pictures. Having
so licensed Disney, we do not see any good reason why
Disney should not be able to dispose of these lawfully made
copies as it wishes. Accord Nimmer, § 8.12[B][3].
Bourne also asserts that it received no “reward” for
Disney's sale of copies of videocassette recordings containing
the Compositions. This assertion, however, ignores the
circumstances by which Bourne came to own these
copyrights. As discussed above, the Compositions at issue
here were created by Disney. Disney, in turn, conveyed these
valuable copyrights to Bourne in exchange for, inter alia,
a broad grant to Disney that would allow it to exploit the
Compositions in connection with its motion pictures. Under
the circumstances of this case, “it may fairly be said that
[Bourne] has received [its] reward for the use of the article.” 4
We therefore reject Bourne's contention that Disney's *633
sale of videocassettes constituted infringement of Bourne's
exclusive right to vend.
4 We also note that a contrary interpretation would leave
Disney in the position of having received a license
to produce videocassettes of its motion pictures for
home viewing by consumers, but being unable to sell
or otherwise dispose of the videocassettes. This would
make little sense. See Nimmer, supra, § 10.10[C].
2. Bourne's Other Contentions
Bourne objects to the district court's denial of certain ancillary
relief in connection with the jury verdict in its favor on its
advertising claim. We see no abuse of discretion in any of the
district court's determinations regarding ancillary relief.
We have considered Bourne's remaining contentions and find
them all to be without merit.
3. The Cross–Appeal
[11]  [12]  Disney's principal contention on its cross-appeal
is that the district court should have entered judgment as a
matter of law on its affirmative defense of estoppel. Judgment
as a matter of law cannot be granted on an issue if “there is
[a] legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury
to find” to the contrary. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Our review
of the record persuades us that a reasonable trier of fact
could have found that Disney had not relied detrimentally
on Bourne's conduct. See General Elec. Capital Corp. v.
Armadora, S.A., 37 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir.1994). In particular,
we note that Disney continued to obtain licenses from Bourne
for the use of the Compositions in television advertisements
during the 1970s and mid–1980s, and that Disney's paid
television advertisements were infrequent up and through this
time period. While Disney certainly provided strong evidence
of estoppel, we believe that the jury was entitled to decide this
issue in favor of Bourne.
We have considered Disney's remaining contentions and find
them all to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
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